This paper examines the impact of the Dutch R&D tax incentive scheme on the wages of R&D workers. We construct firm specific R&D tax credit rates that vary over time following variations in the Dutch R&D tax incentive program. Using instrumental variables we estimate a wage-sharing model with an unbalanced firm-level panel data covering the period 1997-2004. The elasticity of the R&D wage with respect to the fraction of the wage supported by the fiscal incentives scheme is estimated at 0.2 in the short run and 0.24 in the long run.
Introduction
Most OECD countries dedicate significant resources to support private R&D. Two main policy instruments are used for this: direct subsidies and tax incentives. R&D tax incentives seem to have gained in popularity recently. For instance, in 1996, 12 OECD countries offered R&D tax incentives, while in 2008 this number increased to 21 (OECD, 2009 ). This increase is partly due to the fact that the policy of fiscal incentives is more neutral compared to direct subsidies, in principle offering a tax relief to any eligible R&D expenditure.
The usefulness of R&D support programs in general has been traditionally challenged for two reasons: government supported R&D may crowd out private R&D funding or get dissipated in higher R&D wages instead of stimulating real private R&D spending. Many empirical studies have examined the first question and often concluded that there is some additionality, in the sense that firms increase their R&D spending by more than the money they get from government in support of R&D (see Arundel et al., 2008; David, Hall and Toole 2000; Hall, 2002; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000 for reviews of empirical studies). Surprisingly, the other key question, whether and to what extent government R&D support efforts dissipate into higher R&D wages as opposed to creating a R&D quantity effect, has remained largely unexplored. A number of papers on the effectiveness of R&D support programs have included a price effect in their analysis (e.g., Aerts, 2008; Lelarge, 2009; Haegeland and Møen, 2007; Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004) , but most of these studies are concerned with direct R&D subsidies and not R&D fiscal incentives. Studies in labor economics have examined the effect of firm and employee characteristics on wages in general (e.g., Dobbelaere, 2004; Veugelers, 1989) but not specifically on the wages of R&D workers.
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The contribution of this paper is to examine the magnitude of the effect of the Dutch R&D tax incentive program, known as WBSO 1 , on the wages of R&D workers. By studying the price effect of the R&D fiscal incentive program, we seek to contribute to the policy discussion on the effectiveness of R&D support. We borrow from the stream of literature in labor economics to inform us on the specification of the wage equation. In our empirical analysis we use an unbalanced firm-level panel dataset constructed from the annual R&D surveys and production statistics from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Netherlands. The richness of the merged dataset allows us to construct detailed R&D tax disbursement as a function of R&D tax incentives, providing sufficient variation in both the cross-section and time dimensions to identify the effects of the tax incentive program on R&D wages.
Our main empirical finding is that there is a significant price effect of the R&D tax incentive program on the wages of R&D workers in Dutch firms. After allowing for individual heterogeneity, business cycle fluctuations and the endogeneity of R&D tax credits we obtain estimates of the elasticity of R&D wages with respect to tax disbursements that are significantly different from zero. The point estimates of this elasticity range from 19% to 24% depending on whether static or dynamic models, short-run or long-run estimates are considered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on wage determination and government R&D support.
Section 3 lays out our empirical model relating wages to R&D tax incentives, describes our data set and explains how we constructed the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 summarizes and concludes.
1 WBSO stands for "Wet Bevordering Speur-en Ontwikkelingswerk", in full "Wet Vermindering Afdracht Loonbelasting en Premie Volksverzekering, Onderdeel Speur-en Ontwikkelingswerk" (see de Jong and Verhoeven (2007) ), which translating literally means "Law for lowering wage taxes and social security contributions related to R&D activities". This Research and Development (R&D) Tax Credit Act provides fiscal incentives for companies, knowledge centers and self-employed persons who perform R&D work. 
Previous literature
In this section, we briefly review the empirical literature on wage determination and the one on R&D government support. Empirical studies on the effectiveness of direct and indirect R&D support aim at finding out whether firms substitute private R&D financing by direct aid or tax support, i.e. whether there is additionality or crowding out. The literature largely abstracted from the question of how much of the additional R&D is due to a volume effect and how much is due to a wage effect.
Empirical studies that examine the price effects of government support programs are still scant. Reinthaler and Wolff (2008) on a panel of 15 OECD countries, Ali-Yrrkö (2005) for Finland, Üçdoğruk (2004) for Turkey, and Aerts (2008) for Flanders find evidence of a positive effect of direct R&D subsidies on R&D wages. As Aerts (2008) argues, this wage effect could be the result of an inelastic supply of R&D employees or the result of a skill upgrading, skilled workers earning higher wages than unskilled workers. The wage effect could even be higher for tax incentives that are based on R&D labor costs (as in the Netherlands), if firms try to maximize on R&D tax credits. Lelarge (2009) 
concludes for
France that the Young Innovative Firms Program (JEI, "Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes"), which consists in payroll tax cuts for R&D workers in newly created SMEs, has a six times larger effect on wages than the conventional R&D tax credits. She explains this finding by the fact that young firms are more dynamic than other R&D-performing firms, and use these payroll tax rebates to retain their high-skilled researchers. Goolsbee (1997) is the first to have examined the price effects of tax incentives but in the context of physical capital investment. He argues that the low price elasticities of physical investment that are often found in empirical research can be explained by the fact that the short-run increased investment induced by tax incentives is mainly due to increases in the 5 price of capital goods rather than to increases in the quantity of investment. According to his estimates a 10% investment tax credit can increase the price of equipment by as much as 3.5% to 7% in the short run. The inelastic supply of R&D workers, which increases their leverage in negotiated wage settlements, suggests that the wage effect of government R&D support can also be substantial. Goolsbee (1998) has shown that these R&D wage effects are sizable. Using Current Population Survey data he estimates that a 10% increase in total federal R&D expenditure leads to a 3% increase in the wages of R&D workers in the US. He concludes that the price effects limit the efficacy of government intervention to stimulate private R&D in the United States. Romer (2000) argues that the US should worry about the supply of scientists and engineers rather than merely creating more demand for R&D, for instance by granting R&D tax credits. He illustrates why the supply elasticity to rising wages for scientists and engineers is not very high and therefore why the increased R&D expenditure resulting from demand shifters for R&D may increase R&D wages and not just the volume of R&D.
Marey and Borghans (2000) apply a co-integration analysis using sectoral data for the Netherlands and report an average elasticity of R&D wages with respect to total R&D expenditures of 0.52 in the short run and 0.38 in the long run. Haegeland and Møen (2007) estimate on Norwegian firm data that per Euro of R&D tax credit 33 Eurocent go into higher average wages for R&D personnel and that the wage effect is characteristic of SMEs.
The empirical literature on wage determination in labor economics argues that wages are at least in part determined by the sharing in rents generated by efficiency wages, the employer's ability to pay, features of the product market, trade liberalization and technological innovations (e.g., Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; Blanchflower et al., 1996; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Van Reenen, 1996; Veugelers, 6 1989). Assuming risk-neutral preferences on the part of the employees, a version of the following reduced-form equation for the real wage rate W is usually estimated:
where R is a measure of rents to be shared, w is the alternative wage, Z is the vector of controls, and parameter  ( Previous studies have considered different measures of rents, such as profits per employee (Arai, 2003; Blanchflower et al., 1996) , value added per employee (Dobbelaere, 2004) , and Tobin's Q (Salinger, 1984; Van Reenen, 1996) . Parameter  , as explained, can be considered as a constant to be estimated, but it can also be made heterogeneous and modeled to depend on variables such as sectoral unemployment rates, the price index, proxies for product market concentration (e.g., Dobbelaere, 2004; Veugelers, 1989) . Van Reenen (1996) attributes rents to firms' innovation output and R&D input.
In summary, the literature on R&D support acknowledges that part of the effect of R&D government programs may get dissipated in R&D wages. However, the empirical evidence on the magnitude of the wage effect is still scant. In what follows, we explain how we quantify the wage effect of an R&D tax incentive program. The literature on wage determination provides a useful modeling framework to estimate the magnitude of the wage effect. 
Model and data
Our hypothesis is that the R&D tax credits received from government partly accrue to R&D workers in the form of higher wages. There are various ways to justify such a price effect.
Firms may share the R&D tax credits with their R&D personnel by offering higher wages to encourage their R&D department to apply for R&D tax credits. It may also reflect imperfections in the labor market for scientists and engineers, an inelastic supply on that market, the existence of search costs for scientists and engineers or bargaining power of the latter. The point here is not that firms reduce their own R&D funding with government money (crowding out) but that the additional R&D expenditure is split into a quantity and a price effect. To test this hypothesis, we formulate an empirical specification of the wage of R&D workers that is partly determined by the R&D tax credits. We estimate the following equation for firm i at time t:
where W is the R&D wage rate, d is a measure of the R&D tax credit received, L K / is the capital to labor ratio, size is measured in number of employees, w is the alternative wage (proxied by the average sector R&D wage rate in industry j to which firm i belongs), Z is a vector of control variables, and i, j and t are respectively firm, industry and time subscripts.
The parameter of interest  is the price elasticity of R&D wage with respect to the R&D tax credit.
To allow for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity in wages across firms and for common macro-economic shocks, the error term it  in equation (2) includes a firm-specific effect i  , a year-specific intercept t  , in addition to a serially uncorrelated measurement error it u :
The firm-specific effect can also be replaced by an industry specific effect j  , . ,...,
heterogeneity is assumed to vary only across industries. Several studies have estimated a dynamic wage equation, with the lagged wage as an additional explanatory variable, justifying the persistence in wages by the slow adjustment of wages to external shocks (e.g.,
Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). Therefore, we have also estimated a dynamic version of equation (2), which yields both short-and long-run price effects. To estimate such a model we have used the more efficient system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) .
We use two data sources both supplied by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics. The annual R&D surveys contain information on the type and the amount of R&D expenditure and the census data on production statistics contain information on output and labor, as well as sector output deflators. We merge the two data sources using a unique firm identification number.
These data sources and the process of merging them are explained in detail in Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) . In the estimation we use an unbalanced panel of annual firm data between 1997 and 2004.
In this study we estimate a price effect for R&D workers, i.e. for only a small subset of all employees. The average number of R&D workers per firm is about 24 in our sample. If we consider only full-time researchers (and omit research assistants) the mean is about 12
employees. In percentage terms R&D workers make up, on average in our sample, 7.8% of total employment in a firm (3.7% if we exclude research assistants). On average, across the years, the sector real R&D wage rate grew at 3.7% per annum, from an average of a little over 20 €/hour in 1997 to about 26 €/hour. The standard deviation of the average sector wage rate is about 3. It actually decreased over time in our sample, mainly because the sample composition tilted towards larger firms. The cross-sectional variation of the firm wage within 9 sectors is large (average standard deviation of about 10) and accounts for most of the heterogeneity in wages.
The R&D tax incentive facility primarily targets small and medium sized enterprises.
Firms from all manufacturing and service sectors can participate in the program. In 2004 there was the following distribution of firms by sector: agriculture (6%), food (5%), chemicals (12%), machines (28%), other manufacturing (23%), ICT (11%), and other services (14%).
This distribution has stayed more or less constant from 1997 till 2004 (de Jong and Verhoeven, 2007) .
In the empirical analysis the following industries are used with their standard industrial classification code (SBI) in parentheses: food, beverages and tobacco (15-16), textile, apparel and leather (17-19), paper and paper products (21), printing (22) there was a 29% increase in granted applications for the tax credits.
When we split the number of observations in our sample in three categories of firm size we see that the distribution of our sample across size classes remains stable over time:
12% have less than 50 employees, 62% have between 50 and 250 employees and 26% have 10 over 250 employees. . In our final sample the number of observations from firms in that size class is close to 75% of the total. Firms with fewer than 10 employees are not represented in our sample because the CBS does not collect data on these firms in their innovation and R&D surveys.
The R&D cost composition of firms in the sample stayed reasonably constant over time. For instance, the share of the labor component is approximately 75% and remained more or less unchanged in the time period in our sample. the average rate at which an R&D-performing firm can reduce its R&D labor costs by using the R&D tax incentives. We can use it to compute the amount of disbursement, in Euros, which a firm receives back from SenterNovem by simply multiplying The agency's decisions are taken to be completely exogenous in our model, as they are in practice. For identification purposes it is important that there be sufficient variation in it R d , . Formula A1 indicates that this variation comes from several sources. First, there were a number of changes (taken to be exogenous) in the fiscal incentives scheme's parameters. Such changes, reported in Table 1 , occurred in every year except one within our sample period. The first bracket threshold increased three times, the rate applied to the first bracket increased three times, the rate applied to the second bracket changed five times and the ceiling changed twice. Variation of it R d , in the cross-section comes from two sources.
First, the variation is determined by whether a firm applies for the standard or the preferential starter's rate. Second, the effective rate of R&D tax credit depends on how high a firm's R&D wage bill is. This potential source of endogeneity calls for an instrumental variable approach.
We discuss estimation methods in the results section below.
In models of wage determination the equilibrium wage is determined by internal as well as external factors. The latter can be thought of as an opportunity cost or as the current wage in other sectors of the economy (e.g., Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey, 1996; Van Reenen, 1996) . The importance of controlling for the alternative wage depends on the extent to which the skills of R&D workers are firm or industry specific, i.e. substitutability of R&D skills within or across industries. It could be set to zero, an approach taken by Vandenbussche et al. (2001) . Ideally, it should reflect the marginal productivity of labor (MPL) prevailing in each industry. MPL is difficult to measure in practice and we therefore follow the example of Van Reenen (1996) and include average sector R&D wage as a proxy for alternative wage.
Alternatively, we could interpret our results as a premium over the industry wage determined by an (inelastic) R&D labor supply curve.
Previous contributions found that wages are positively correlated with firm size and capital intensity. A positive effect of size on wages can arise as a result of collective wage bargaining at the industry level (Blanchflower et al., 1996; Forslund, 1994; Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991) . Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) using a large employer-employee French panel dataset find that firms that pay higher wages are more capital intensive and productive. Given equal union status, several authors have found that there is a wage premium for workers employed by large firms. Large firms can enjoy more market power and be more successful in attracting higher-quality workers (Albaek et al., 1998; Melow, 1982; Brown and Medoff, 1989) .
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We include K/L, the capital-to-labor ratio, as a control variable. According to Bronars and Famulari (2001) complementarity between capital and skilled labor will lead capital intensive firms to hiring more skilled workers (with a higher productivity of labor). When labor costs are negligible vis-à-vis the cost of capital, employers' resistance to wage demand is expected to be smaller (Arai, 2003) . According to the efficiency wage theory, a higher capital-labor ratio can also lead to an increase in the cost of production and prompt firms to accord a wage premium to encourage their employees to reduce costs by improving performance (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen, 1986).
To control for firm size we include ln Size, the logarithm of the firm's number of employees. Brown and Medoff (1989) offer several explanations rooted in 'compensating differentials' as well as institutional theory for the positive correlation between firm size and wage premium. These factors capture the desire of larger employers to 'follow a strategy of positive labor relations' as well as their advantage over smaller rivals in attracting higher labor quality.
Many studies have uncovered cyclicality of wages over the business cycle (see Abraham and Haltiwanger, 1995, for a review; Bils, 1985; Kean et al., 1988; Solon et al., 1994) . Cyclical wage movements can be the result of technology shocks shifting short-run demand curves against fixed supply curves or of movements along a fixed short-run labor demand curve 6 . We include controls for business cycle influences on R&D investment by using industry-specific business cycle indicators: for investment potential (i.e. solvability and return on total assets) and indicators for perceived competition, turbulence and economic development. These time-varying business-cycle variables at the industry level are collected in vector Z in expression (2). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimation. A positive relationship is expected between the effective rate of R&D tax credit and the wage rate, if there is a price effect of the tax incentives program.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

Empirical results
In order to get a feeling of a possible effect of the Dutch R&D tax incentives on R&D wages, we estimated the dynamic factor demand model for R&D from Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), where the R&D investment was regressed on the user cost of R&D and other control variables, by replacing the R&D denominated in constant prices by the R&D in current prices.
In the absence of a price effect, the elasticities of real and nominal R&D to variations in the user cost of R&D, generated by changes in the R&D tax incentives, should be the same. The effect of R&D tax incentives on nominal R&D (via changes in the user cost of R&D) can hence be decomposed into a price effect and a quantity effect. We obtain a nominal short-run elasticity of -0.45 and a nominal long-run elasticity of -0.83, both statistically significant. By comparing these nominal effects with the estimated real effects (short-run elasticity of -0.42 and long-run elasticity of -0.79), reported in Lokshin and Mohnen (2012, Table 4 , last column), we arrive at a price effect of changes in the user cost of R&D of approximately 8% in the short run and 5% in the long run. On the basis of this result, we expect to uncover a positive price effect from R&D tax incentives from the estimation of our model specified in section 2, to which we now turn. Table 3 reports the results of Equation (2). As a benchmark case, in column (1) we report the results from an OLS regression without firm-specific fixed effects but with industry dummies in which the R&D tax credit disbursement variable is treated as exogenous. The elasticity of the wage with respect to the effective R&D tax credit is rather small (0.06), yet statistically significant. In column (2) We run a number of tests to check the validity of our instruments. First, we examined the fit of the first-stage regression, where the effective tax rate is regressed on all exogenous variables in the model including the excluded instrumental variables. The F-statistic, (F (17, 7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. The Stock and Yogo test (Stock and Yogo, 2005) rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak allowing for a 10% distortion in the size of the Wald test using IV rather than OLS. Furthermore, the Sargan/Hansen test statistic is small (1.32, with a p-value of 0.25) and therefore does not reject the validity of the instruments. We also checked whether the capital-to-labor ratio variable is endogenous and needs to be instrumented. The obtained Cstatistic (1.32, with a p-value of 0.24) is quite small, and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of this variable.
We find that the tax credit elasticity increases slightly from 0.159 in column (2) to 0.21 in column (3) after instrumenting the R&D tax credit disbursements.
Among the control variables, the capital-to-labor ratio is not statistically significant in the fixed-effects IV version of the model, the firm size and the alternative wage variables are significant only at 10% when individual effects and the endogeneity of the tax credit are taken into account. Experiments with the quadratic terms of the capital-to-labor ratio and the firm size revealed that these coefficients are hardly significant. The business cycle variables are jointly significant in the estimation based on the within transformation of column (3).
Several experiments were carried out to check the robustness of the findings. To check for the effect of changes in a firm's employment structure, such as in its skill composition, as a result of tax credits, we estimated separate regression in which the ratio of the number of senior research staff to research assistants is the outcome variable. The tax credit variable was not found to be significant in this specification.
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This finding is in line with our hypothesis that the tax credit dissipates primarily in rents for R&D workers and does not lead firms to change the composition in their R&D workers (such as substituting low-cost workers by highcost workers).
Previous empirical studies report significant differences in the ability of specific groups of workers to command higher wages (e.g. Black and Strahan, 2001; Nekby, 2003) .
R&D intensity and R&D wages could be correlated if R&D workers -scientists and engineers and R&D supporting personnel -constitute a relatively important group of workers within a firm. According to Sap (1993) the relative importance of a group can under certain conditions determine the bargaining power of this group. A higher R&D intensity ratio captures to some extent the importance of R&D workers within a firm. We added as an additional control variable the firm's real, other-than-labor, R&D expenditures divided by total sales 9 .
Controlling for the R&D intensity at the firm level could also be important if high-ability and consequently high-wage workers systematically "sort" out into more R&D intensive firms.
The coefficient on R&D intensity was, however, not significant at the conventional levels of significance, suggesting that there is not systematic "sorting out".
Several previous studies have estimated a dynamic version of equation (2) justifying wage persistence by, for example, the slow adjustment of wages to external shocks (e.g., Hildreth and Oswald, 1997). We therefore also estimated a dynamic version of equation (2) by including a lagged wage term on the right-hand side. In a dynamic model the "within" estimator leads to inconsistent estimates. To overcome this problem we used the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . The estimates from the dynamic model are presented in column (7) of Table 3 . We used as instruments the two period lagged values of the wage rate and of the effective rate of R&D tax credit in addition to the contemporaneous values of the exogenous variables. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject the validity of the instruments (the p-value is 0.14). The Arellano-Bond auto-correlation (AR) test applied to the differenced residuals of the GMM estimation indicates that there is no serial correlation in the error terms as the AR (2) We conclude that R&D tax incentives get partly dissipated in wages for R&D workers instead of contributing to additional R&D. If we compare the 0.2 wage elasticity estimated 10 We note that first-order autocorrelation, AR(1), in the differenced residuals occurs by construction.
here to our 0.79 elasticity of R&D stock reported in Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), then we can say that the real effect of R&D tax incentives and the ensuing bang for the buck could be could be higher by a magnitude of 25%, if there was no wage effect.
Discussion and conclusions
This paper examines the price effect of the Dutch R&D tax incentive program aimed at stimulating R&D expenditures in business firms. Fiscal incentives are the main policy instrument in the Netherlands to promote R&D by granting firms deductions from their social security contributions proportionately to their annual R&D wage bill. A recent evaluation of the fiscal incentives program concluded that it was effective in stimulating business R&D (Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012) . This paper provides micro-level econometric evidence that there is also a wage effect related to the R&D tax incentives program. Part of the R&D tax credits get transmitted into higher R&D wages because of inelastic labor supply, search costs for scientists and engineers, incentives given to R&D employees, or bargaining power of R&D employees.
To estimate the magnitude of the price elasticity we exploit a rich unbalanced firmlevel panel data set covering the years 1997-2004. We estimate a model sharing-in model where the average R&D wage depends on the effective rate of R&D tax credit, the alternative industry wage, and several firm and industry specific control variables. We allow for individual heterogeneity, and we correct for the endogeneity of the effective rate of R&D tax credit and for the dynamic panel bias when we estimate a dynamic version of the model. The estimated elasticity of the average R&D wage with respect to the effective rate of R&D tax credit is significantly different from zero and of the order of 0.2, with little difference between 20 the short-run and the long-run effect because the average wage adjusts quickly to its optimal value.
Our estimates of the wage effects are somewhat smaller than those found by Goolsbee (1998) for the U.S. and by Marey and Borghans (2000) for the Netherlands. This difference could be due to two reasons. First, the level of aggregation is different. Goolsbee (1998) works at the aggregate level and Marey and Borghans (2000) Our findings have a number of policy implications. The existence of a wage effect of R&D tax credits suggests that the efficiency of the R&D tax incentive program could be enhanced if the wage effect could be avoided. What goes into higher wages for scientists and engineers could go into more real expenditures on research and development. We estimate the wage effect to reduce the quantity effect and the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives by some 21 25 percent. On the other hand, higher wages might be the price to pay to retain high-skilled researchers with promising returns in the future.
There are a number of limitations in our approach. The model presented in this paper assumes a constant disbursement parameter across all R&D workers. A more refined analysis, which would allow this parameter to differ across R&D workers, could not be performed because of the lack of data on individual-specific wages. This issue could be addressed in the future when the Central Bureau of Statistics makes it possible to link firm and individualspecific data. Relying on aggregated firm data does not allow us to control for differences in R&D workers' characteristics such as seniority and schooling. Inability to control for individual worker characteristics amounts to an omitted variables bias (see Abowd et al., 1999 , for discussion). The aggregation bias is mitigated if R&D incentives affect all R&D workers of a firm, which is the case in our data. 
